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Rajasthan is seen as the forerunner with respect to the implementation of the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), both in terms of scale of works and 
transparency safeguards. This combination has meant that large numbers of people 
have benefited from the NREGA in the state. The scale of NREGA works in 
Rajasthan is impressive: according to official statistics, in 2006-7 and 2007-8 
Rajasthan generated 77 days and 68 days, respectively, of employment per rural 
household (in the districts where NREGA was in force), the highest in the country.
1  
 
More recently, there have been positive reports of Rajasthan’s efforts to improve 
worksite management.
2 Proper worksite management is essential for at least three 
purposes: ensuring good working conditions and the provision of mandatory worksite 
facilities
3; implementing the transparency safeguards; providing technical supervision 
to ensure satisfactory labour productivity and asset creation.  
 
Related to effective worksite management, an important issue that has not been 
resolved yet is that often NREGA labourers in Rajasthan are not paid the statutory 
minimum wage. Low wages are commonly attributed to low productivity on 
worksites. This means that labourers do not (or are unable to) perform the “task” 
required to earn the minimum wage. There could be several reasons for this: excessive 
productivity norms, confusion or lack of awareness regarding the task that must be 
performed to earn the minimum wage, poor worksite supervision arrangements, and 
poor work incentives related to the system of wage calculation.
4  
                                                 
∗ The field work for this paper was done in collaboration with Shiva Dhakal and Vivek S. Thanks are 
also due to Nikhil Dey for advice and suggestions, and to Rohit Kumar (District Collector, Jalore) for 
helpful information about the Jalore experiment. Thanks to Jean Drèze for helping me think through 
the issues raised here. The paper was presented at a seminar at the Centre for Development Economics 
at the Delhi School of Economics. I would like to thank the participants for their comments and 
feedback. 
1 See Drèze and Oldiges (2007) for 2006-7 figures. I am grateful to Christian Oldiges for sharing the 
2007-8 figure calculated from www.nrega.nic.in. 
2 See Rohit Kumar (2007) and Yamini Iyer (2007). See also Ridge (2008). 
3 The following essential worksite facilities are mandatory under the Act: shade for periods of rest; 
drinking water; first aid. If more than five children under the age of six years are present at the 
worksite, one female worker should be deputed to look after them and paid the minimum wage. 
4 Discussions with labourers suggest that poor, faulty or non-existent measurement by Junior Engineers 
could also have a bearing on the low wage rates. There were frequent complaints regarding the wage 
not being commensurate to the output and of the “lead and lift” not being taken into account. While it 
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This brief note takes a closer look at an experiment of training mates (worksite 
supervisors) in Rajasthan to improve worksite management.
5 It is based on a four-day 
field visit (11-14 February, 2008) to Jalore district where this experiment is said to 
have been a success. A team of three researchers visited nine ongoing worksites from 
two blocks of Jalore (Raniwara and Jalore) and two completed worksites.
6  
 
The Gram Panchayats (GPs) visited include Bakra Road (one worksite), Leta (two 
worksites), Oon (one worksite) and Sankarna (three worksites) in Jalore Block. For 
this Block we got a list of Gram Panchayats with ongoing works. From this list, we 
selected Bakra Road and Sankarna because they were served by buses and Leta and 
Oon because these were accessible by bicycle. The closest Gram Panchayat was Leta 
(6 km from Jalore district headquarters) and the furthest was Bakra Road (about 25 
km away). We also visited two GPs in Raniwara Block on the recommendation of the 
District Collector and Block Development Officer. 
 
 
2. The Wage Payment System 
 
The NREGA permits wage payments on daily rate as well as on piece rate. Rajasthan 
has followed the piece rate system, whereby wages are paid according to the work 
performed, and a prescribed “task” must be completed in order to earn the minimum 
wage. For instance, for digging, the prescribed task consists of a given number of 
cubic feet, which varies by soil type and also takes into account lead (the distance the 
soil is carried) and lift (the gradient). The details of these productivity norms are listed 
in the “Schedule of Rates”. Under the Act, the Schedule of Rates has to be such that 




Further, following the earlier tradition of public works in Rajasthan, wage payments 
on NREGA works are based on “collective measurement”. The total output (e.g., 
cubic feet of earth dug) of all the workers employed at a particular worksite is 
                                                                                                                                            
is true that Junior Engineers are overworked, there is no reason why poor labourers should pay the 
price for this. 
5 See Kumar (2007) and Iyer (2007) for more details on this experiment. 
6 Preliminary observations from a more detailed survey conducted in Dungarpur and Sirohi districts in 
May-June 2008 are also reported in the concluding section. 
7 A circular issued by the Ministry of Rural Development in 14 January 2008 extended the length of the 
working day from seven hours to nine hours; a follow-up circular, dated 28 May, 2008, clarified that 
this would include a one-hour break; for further details see www.nrega.nic.in. 
  2measured once, collectively, at the end of a fortnight. The total output is divided by 
the total task (required to earn the minimum wage). Thus, if total task equals total 
output, then all labourers earn the minimum wage. If the total output is less than the 
total task, labourers earn proportionately lower wages.
8  
 
Under the collective measurement system, all labourers earn the same wage, based on 
their joint effort. In this system, in order to earn the minimum wage, labourers would 
have to cooperate with each other and work towards producing an output that equals 
the prescribed total task. If some labourers do not cooperate, it is likely to affect the 
work incentive for the others also, driving the wage rate down for all workers.
9
 
The poor work incentives associated with the collective measurement system appear 
to be the main reason why Rajasthan has witnessed some of the lowest NREGA 
wages. The average wage earned in Rajasthan in 2006-7 was Rs. 51 per day, much 
lower than the statutory minimum of Rs. 73 per day, and less than the average wage in 
any other state (see Drèze and Oldiges, 2007).
10 More recently, in February 2008, we 
came across similarly low wages (starting from Rs. 30 per day) in Jhalawar, Jalore 
and Barmer districts. 
 
To address this problem, the Government of Rajasthan recently began an experiment 
of group measurement (as opposed to collective measurement), in collaboration with 
Rozgar Evam Suchna ka Adhikar Abhiyan. Briefly, this experiment entailed the 
formation of groups of five workers at a worksite (typically more than 40 labourers 
work at any given worksite). This experiment required that there be trained “mates” 
(worksite supervisors), who would not only mark attendance but also assign each 
group its “task” and measure the “output” of the group. Both, assigning and 
measuring, are to be done on a daily basis. Workers are then paid based on the output 
of the group, rather than of the worksite as a whole. This was expected to lead to 
higher work incentives, labour productivity, and wages. Aside from this, the posting 
of trained mates at NREGA worksites was expected to further the general objectives 
of improved worksite management, mentioned earlier. 
 
3. Group Measurement in Practice 
 
                                                 
8 Under this system, the minimum wage is effectively the maximum that a labourer can earn. 
9 This phenomenon has been referred to as an “inefficient work culture” by some (see for instance, 
Kumar, 2007). 
10 See also Drèze and Lal (2007). From 1 April 2008, the minimum wage in Rajasthan was increased to 
Rs. 100 per day (from Rs. 73).  
  3A. Mate Training 
 
Of the nine worksites that we investigated, two did not have any mate. We met trained 
(including semi-trained) mates at seven out of nine worksites.
11 Four sites had mahila 
(female) mates; three mates were men. The mates we met said that the training 
covered the following matters: 
 
1. Maintenance of muster rolls; 
2. Basics of work measurement; 
3. Maintenance of the measurement sheet or "mate maap pustika" (MMP); and 
4. Provision of worksite facilities (e.g., medicine kits). 
 
Apart from this, it is not clear how much they were told about the Act. One mate we 
met did not know the minimum wage whereas another did not know about work 
application procedures or the unemployment allowance.
12  
 
In Jalore, mahila mates have been trained in large numbers. The experiment of 
training of mahila mates was quite impressive. When I met one woman from 
Raniwara Gram Panchayat, and asked her why she was not working on the NREGA 
sites even though she had not exhausted her 100 day entitlement, she said, "ab to mate 
ka hi kaam karna hai" (Now I only want to work as a mate). Allowing women who 
have studied up to class 5 or 8 to train as mates has enabled the creation of a large 
pool of mahila mates – as many as five or six in each revenue village, according to the 
District Collector. 
 
Mates had formed groups at many worksites and most mates knew about the task 
required to earn the minimum wage. Generally, they also had the mate’s kit consisting 
of the MMP, a calculator and a measuring tape. At some worksites, we even came 
across some child-care facilities and provision of a tent to provide shade for period of 
rest.  
 
B. Group Formation 
 
                                                 
11 The reason why there were untrained mates at the other worksites is that in those villages, the trained 
mates had exhausted their quota of 100 days of work. 
12 See Kumar (2007: pp. 3-6) for a detailed discussion of what the training is supposed to have 
consisted of. It is possible that the mates we met retained only part of what was discussed at the 
training. 
  4In order for group measurement to happen, the formation of groups (at the beginning 
of the fortnight, when new muster rolls are issued) is essential. At some worksites, 
however, groups had not been formed. Where groups had been formed, the names of 
labourers had been recorded group-wise on the MMP. The groups were self-selected, 
i.e., labourers had decided on their own who would be part of their group (this is how 
it is meant to happen).  
 
C. Group Measurement 
 
Group measurement was not happening at any of the worksites that we visited. The 
practice seems to be that the mate marks out the task at the beginning of the day. 
Whether they measure accurately, or at all, at the end of the day was not clear.
13 The 
common practice seemed to be to credit each group with the full task in the MMP. In 
the absence of group measurement, different groups were not getting different wages. 
 
We were told that there were a few instances of group-wise measurement in the past 
but that these had stopped. In one GP in Raniwara, measurements were made 
separately for each mate’s groups (i.e. separate measurement for each of the mates so 
that all the groups supervised by him/her got the same rate). This - different rates for 
workers supervised by different mates (rather than for different groups) on the same 
worksite - led to a fight. The labourers said "aap log hamare mein phoot daal rahe 
hain" (you are creating divisions amongst us labourers). This was resolved by 
agreeing that all workers would get the same rate. 
 
 
4. Reasons for Improved Productivity with Group Measurement 
 
Group formation (GF) and group measurement (GM) can increase labour productivity 
for three distinct reasons:  
 
A. Improved work incentives;  
B. Better monitoring;  
C. Greater clarity regarding task. 
 
 
A. Improved Work Incentives 
                                                 
13 At one of the worksites where we were at 5pm, no measurement was done and the labourers left with 
us. This is also the only worksite where every single labourer was sitting when we arrived. 
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Under the collective measurement system, the wage earned by each labourer is not 
directly related to his or her effort. It also depends on the effort of all those who are 
working at the same worksite. Under group measurement, labourers earn according to 
their group’s output, linking productivity more directly with the rewards. To that 
extent, group measurement leads to better work incentives. 
 
However, for productivity to improve in this manner, both GF and GM are required. 
GF alone will not enhance work incentives. 
 
In Jalore the District Collector, Block officials and Junior Engineer claimed that both 
GF and GM were in place. As mentioned before, this was not borne out at the 
worksites that we visited – only GF was being practiced. 
 
Officials also claim that now everyone does the full task. Many labourers, mates and 
most officials claimed that the task done had increased as a result of the formation of 
work groups. To substantiate this claim, they point to the rising wage rate: the wage 
rate in Jalore District has shown a steady upward trend since the introduction of group 
formation and group measurement: starting at Rs. 45-48 per day in May 2007, it was 
nearly touching Rs. 70 in November-December 2007.
14
 
This rise in wages could be due to an actual increase in output, or simply to the fact 
that recorded output has increased (without an increase in productivity). As discussed 
below, it is quite possible that productivity did increase, in spite of the absence of 
actual group measurement. But mates generally have no incentive to actually measure 
the output everyday or to record the actual output as measured by them (if they do 
measure).  
 
I also noticed a tendency to “over-measure”, in the sense that the mate, irrespective of 
the output, records in the MMP that each group has completed the prescribed task.  It 
seems that mates just record that the full task has been done. At least at one worksite, 
the mate was filling in the measurement for all days of the fortnight, in front of us. At 
yet another worksite, the mate was filling in the measurement for that particular day, 
even though he had not measured and nor was the day over yet. The way the MMP 
had been filled indicated that they had just put the same numbers down for each team. 
I suspect similar practices are common at other worksites as well, because of the 
“look” of the MMP (with uniform entries for all groups).  
                                                 
14 See Kumar (2007), p. 7. 
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It is not clear what incentive the mates have to measure output honestly (or at all). In 
principle, if a mate over-measures, he or she will be “caught” when the Junior 
Engineer does the collective measurement at the end of the fortnight. From this brief 
survey, it was not very clear how often discrepancies arose between the mates’ MMPs 
and the Junior Engineer’s measurements, and how these discrepancies were resolved. 
It seemed that in some cases, the Junior Engineer’s measurements “overrode” the 
MMPs as far as wage payments are concerned; this would amount to falling back on 
collective measurement. In other cases, the Junior Engineer probably accommodated 
the MMP by adjusting his own estimates. This undermines the verification role of the 
Junior Engineer’s measurements and opens the door to over-measurements by the 
mates. 
 
Thus, the rising trend in wages could reflect “over-measurement” on the part of the 
mates as much as actual improvements in productivity at NREGA worksites.
15
 




When labourers are working in groups of five, it is easier for them to monitor each 
other and to pull up any “shirker(s)” amongst them, than when they work in groups of 
40 or more (which is generally the case under collective measurements). Shirking 
becomes more difficult under these circumstances. 
 
At one of the worksites that we visited in Sankarna Panchayat, women said that 
working in groups was better because earlier the better off labourers, to whom the 
wage rate didn’t matter much, would sit around; this harmed those of them who 
needed the money and wanted a better wage rate. With smaller groups, it was easier 
for them to monitor each other. Besides this, women at other worksites also said that 
working in smaller groups allowed them to divide tasks (e.g., digging, loading, 
carrying) amongst themselves in a more efficient manner.  
 
Mate Monitoring  
 
                                                 
15 It is also worth noting that there have been periodic revisions of the “Schedule of Rates” in Rajasthan 
during the last two years, with the standard “task” being relaxed each time. This, in itself, would 
contribute to higher wages, even in the absence of any change in productivity. 
  7The formation of groups also enables better worksite supervision by the mate. It 
becomes easier for the mate to spot which group(s) are lagging behind in the 
completion of their task. This also puts pressure on the labourers to work because 
closer monitoring by the mate is possible.  
 
In larger groups, NREGA labourers said that each one thinks that the other will work, 
or that it wasn’t clear how much they were supposed to do, and the mate could not 
single out one set of people to pull up for poor productivity until it was too late.  
 
The bottom line is that working in groups facilitates work monitoring - both peer 
monitoring and supervision on the part of the mates.  
 
C. Greater Clarity regarding Task 
 
With collective measurement, when labourers work in batches of 40 or more, it is 
difficult for them to understand the task required to earn the minimum wage. In 
smaller groups, the task can be marked out more easily. Discussions with labourers 
indicated that improved clarity regarding what is required of them is an important 
factor in raising productivity. 
 
For instance, labourers working in groups of 40 or more may not understand how 
much earth exactly they need to dig in order to earn Rs. 73 per day (the minimum 
wage at the time of this investigation). When groups are formed, the task for each 
group of five is marked out for them and makes the job of completing it easier. Thus, 
even if each group’s output is not measured separately at the end of the fortnight, the 
labourers may have achieved more output than before just on account of having better 
understood what is required of them. 
 
We also tried to understand the labourers’ perspective on group measurement versus 
collective measurement. It was not clear whether labourers prefer GM or CM. Some 
said that they preferred not to work in groups because the aged and other physically 
weak persons would be the losers in a group measurement system. Able-bodied 
persons may not be willing to allow older persons in their group, for fear of reducing 
their own wage rate. On the other hand, if the older persons are from their own family 
or caste, or if there are other forms of solidarity amongst the labourers, then older 
persons may be grouped with the able-bodied. For instance, in other places labourers 
said that if old people do show up for work, then they spread them across different 
groups, so that their “burden” can be shared by everyone. Similarly, we met a 
  8disabled man who had worked as a mate but who felt that the GM system was not 
good for the disabled because nobody wanted them in their group. 
 
Sometimes women said that they preferred working in groups because they can finish 
their task early, and work at their own pace. But follow-up questions revealed that 
they can rarely finish the task early, and even if they are able to do so, they have to 
stay at the worksite until 5pm because they worry about “checking” (they will be 
marked absent if they aren’t around). If labourers are allowed to pace themselves and 
leave early when they complete their day’s task it would greatly strengthen the 
argument in favour of GM. This is especially true of women who often combine 
NREGA work with other household chores and responsibilities.  
 
 
5. Worksite Management in Rajasthan: Post-script 
 
In May-June 2008, the G. B. Pant Social Science Institute initiated a survey of 
NREGA in six states (Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan 
and Uttar Pradesh). In Rajasthan, the survey teams covered 10 worksites each in 
Dungarpur and Sirohi districts and interviewed 200 workers employed at these 
worksites. The findings of this survey confirm that worksite management in Rajasthan 
is much better than most other states. Close to 80 percent of the worksites visited had 
trained mates. This has enabled the implementation of transparency safeguards in the 
state: muster rolls were available at 86 per cent of the worksites, labourers at all 
worksites said that they signed the muster roll at the time of payment of wages, and 
simultaneously corresponding entries were made in their job cards. Investigators were 
able to find muster rolls at only one out of every ten worksites visited in the other 
survey states. 
 
Further, the presence of trained mates has also meant that basic worksite facilities are 
more likely to be found in Rajasthan than in any of the other survey states. For 
instance, most of the worksites in Rajasthan had drinking water, compared with just 
half of the worksites in the other states.  
 
Where trained mates had been posted, they had been told about the formation of 
groups and in many cases they had also been provided with a MMP to record group-
wise measurements.  
 
However, as with our own investigation in Jalore, the investigators found that in 
almost all cases, wages were still being calculated on the basis of collective 
  9measurements made by the Junior Engineer. Labourers at all worksites reported 
getting less than the minimum wage.  The average wage earned was Rs. 71/day (the 
statutory minimum in Rajasthan is Rs. 100/day). 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The main purpose of the mate training experiment in Rajasthan was to improve labour 
productivity. I find that its impact on raising labour productivity is unclear. The 
experiment, however, has much to contribute to better worksite management. 
 
While groups had been formed at most of the worksites that we visited, not a single 
worksite was practicing group measurement. It is therefore difficult to attribute the 
rising wage in Jalore to the driving out of shirkers through group measurement, as has 
been claimed. 
 
The main impact of this experiment on labour productivity seems to operate through 
the formation of groups. If the wage rate has been increasing on account of improved 
productivity (rather than due to inflated measurement), it is probably because GF 
facilitates better worksite supervision and peer monitoring, rather than on account of 
greater work incentives. Further, GF can have an impact on productivity because of 
the greater clarity amongst labourers regarding the prescribed task. Group formation 
alone seems to affect productivity, independently of group measurement. Even that is 
a significant achievement given that low productivity is a genuine problem on 
NREGA works in Rajasthan.
16  
 
The uncertain impact of trained mates on labour productivity does not detract from 
the value of this initiative as a step towards better worksite management. Trained 
mates are definitely required at NREGA worksites, and have much to contribute (e.g. 
in terms of better provision of worksite facilities, improved record-keeping, and 
implementation of the transparency safeguards), whether or not group measurement is 
practiced. 
 
                                                 
16 I witnessed an extreme example of low productivity in Chohtan Block of Barmer District, at a 
worksite where approximately 250 workers were employed, but very few were actually working at the 
time of my visit. This worksite was like a large picnic, with groups of labourers sheltering themselves 
under trees, cooking and resting, until our arrival. This is not a general pattern (it is worst I have seen, 
as far as labour productivity is concerned), but it does illustrate the vulnerabilities of the collective 
measurement system. 
  10The training of mates has certainly helped to protect the entitlements of labourers - in 
the sense of provision of mandatory worksite facilities, as well as protecting them 
from corrupt practices. Rajasthan is still among the few states that have taken the 
transparency safeguards, prescribed in the NREGA Operational Guidelines and in the 
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